November 2006

Eugene: A potential framework for approaching North Korea

I have been thinking a great deal recently about the best way to approach work in North Korea. Outlined below is a putative framework for approaching such work:

The recent nuclear test performed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has drawn the attention of the international community back to the ongoing struggles and affairs that have remained unresolved on the Korean peninsula. As a single event, the test was a critical catalyst to attract international attention to the DPRK, but more importantly, the incident represents a nadir to deteriorating diplomatic efforts with North Korea. For over a decade, the DPRK has negotiated with international parties over critical issues, including nuclear arms proliferation. The failure of these efforts in halting the development of nuclear weapons indicates an essential failure of diplomacy. As a result of these deteriorating diplomatic efforts, the DPRK has become increasingly isolated, antagonized, and neglected.

The United States government has played a particularly influential role in diplomatic efforts with the DPRK. At the six-party talks held on September of 2005, North Korea agreed to halt its nuclear defense program if the United States agreed to stop isolating the DPRK. Another hope of the North Koreans in that agreement was to initiate official diplomatic engagement with the United States. Regrettably, the agreement flopped: official diplomatic communication between the two parties never developed and the North Koreans’ weapons program persisted. This deteriorating diplomatic relationship has been further strained by recent sanctions that have been supported by the United States in response to the nuclear testing of the DPRK.

South Korea has also been a key player in diplomatic efforts with the DPRK. Ever since the cease-fire on July 27, 1953, the Korean peninsula has been split into two halves- the North and South. The lack of complete resolution following the Korean War accounts for the ongoing tension between the two governments. In the last decade, however, there have been promising steps towards peaceful resolution. On June 23, 2000, at a landmark summit involving the South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and Secretary General Kim Jung-Il of the DPRK, Koreans were given hope for peaceful resolution to lasting conflict. For the first time, eventual reunification of the two sides was considered a possibility. Growing support for reunification plans contributed to the formation of the Ministry of Unification of the South Korean government as well as its counterpart in the North. By improving communication and cultural exchange, the government agencies have strived to enhance the homogeneity of the two divergent groups in preparation for future reunification. Unfortunately, this budding relationship has been strained recently by the unified international front against the North Korean nuclear tests. Even South Korea has agreed to support sanctions against the North.
Yet another major party that has been deeply involved with the politics of the DPRK has been China. Koreans often describe the relationship between China and North Korea using the expression “Soon Mang Chi Han.� The expression is an analogy that represents North Korea as the lip protecting China’s teeth. In other words, North Korea is often portrayed as a buffer zone between South Korea (and its American presence) and mainland China. This benefit may, in part, explain the historical support by China of the military regime in North Korea. Especially during difficult periods in North Korean history, the Chinese have provided critical economic support for the DPRK. Just recently, however, Chinese policy towards North Korea has started to shift. Following the test launch of several missiles by North Korea, the Chinese government agreed to sign a UN treaty in response to the actions of North Korea. They have also agreed to sanctions in response to the nuclear weapons test. However, the shift in policy may have started much earlier. Back in April 2004, the Chinese suspended provision of oil and food to North Korea. At the time, 60-70% of such supplies came from mainland China, so the decision had a dramatic effect on the North. Regardless of the timing of this shift, the important point is that the Chinese government is providing less support for the regime in North Korea. Since China has such a crucial role in the economic stability of North Korea, the notable shift in support will have important consequences for stability in Pyongyang.
With all of this in mind, the diplomatic outlook is remarkably bleak. The international community has developed a unified front against the DPRK, and the sanctions imposed on the DPRK serve to further isolate North Korea from the outside world. By supporting sanctions, the governments of the United States, China, and South Korea have antagonized the North Korean regime, complicating subsequent political and diplomatic efforts that will be necessary to improve the situation. This strained relationship between political bodies presents a daunting challenge to effective diplomacy and suggests a possible role for grassroots efforts to improve relations and work towards resolution.

A potential source for such a grassroots movement may lie in a unique ethnographic feature common to the United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea: each has a significant population of Korean citizens. To the North Koreans and South Koreans who view Korean-Chinese and Korean-Americans as Diaspora, there is a profound sense of nationalism that crosses national and even political borders. With this sense of common heritage, Korean citizens in each of these countries will be critical players in bridging divides, improving relations, and meeting the immediate and future needs of the North Korean people.