Myles Mann

May 2015

In the midst of a biosecurity emergency, widespread public fear will exacerbate existing constraints on public and private resources. History has shown that public fear, even in minor outbreaks, threatens to invoke significant adverse effects on the economy and disrupt social order. Fear also triggers significant political pressure to engage in irresponsible public policy that distracts public officials from more pressing issues in biosecurity response efforts. Perhaps most importantly, fear causes individuals to falsely believe that they suffer from the pathogen in question, thereby overwhelming the health system with requests for diagnostic care. Such mechanisms also work in the reverse, as research has shown that fear of social stigmatization may cause infected individuals to ignore early symptoms and refrain from seeking medical care.

Policymakers must be well prepared to manage public perception during an outbreak (and especially after a bioterrorist attack when fear is heightened) in order to find a balance between emphasizing the seriousness of the ailment and avoiding panic by reassuring the public that its chances of contracting a pathogen are low. The United States and, more importantly, the global community must not only prepare for the scientific response to a potential bioterrorist attack; it must also prepare to deal with a panicked public that could well do more damage to the nation’s welfare than would a pathogen. While the ideal response will vary on a case-to-case basis, the United States should be prepared to engage in public awareness campaigns, work with the media to downplay sensational news coverage, engage in dialogue with local communities to target at-risk demographics, and invest in innovative countermeasures, such as drive-through triage, to better prepare for a biosecurity emergency.